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One strand of endogenous-growth  models assumes constant returns 
to a broad concept  of capital. I extend  these  models  to include  tax- 
financed  government  services  that  affect  production  or  utility. 
Growth and saving rates fall with an increase in utility-type expendi- 
tures; the two rates rise initially with productive  government  expen- 
ditures  but  subsequently  decline.  With an  income  tax,  the  decen- 
tralized  choices  of  growth  and  saving  are  "too  low,"  but  if  the 
production  function  is  Cobb-Douglas,  the  optimizing  government 
still satisfies a natural condition  for productive  efficiency.  Empirical 
evidence  across  countries  supports  some  of  the  hypotheses  about 
government  and  growth. 
Recent  models  of  economic  growth  can  generate  long-term  growth 
without  relying  on  exogenous  changes  in  technology  or  population. 
Some  of  the  models  amount  to  theories  of  technological  progress 
(Romer  1986;  this  issue)  and  others  to  theories  of  population  change 
(Becker  and  Barro  1988).  A  general  feature  of  these  models  is  the 
presence  of  constant  or  increasing  returns  in  the  factors  that  can  be 
accumulated  (Lucas  1988;  Romer  1989;  Rebelo  1991). 
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One  strand of the literature  on endogenous  economic  growth con- 
cerns  models  in  which  private  and  social  returns  to investment  di- 
verge,  so that decentralized  choices lead to suboptimal rates of saving 
and  economic  growth  (Arrow  1962;  Romer  1986).  In  this  setting 
private returns to scale may be diminishing,  but social returns-which 
reflect spillovers of knowledge  or other externalities-can  be constant 
or increasing.  Another  line of research involves models without exter- 
nalities,  in  which  the  privately  determined  choices  of  saving  and 
growth  are Pareto optimal  (Rebelo  1991). These  models  rely on con- 
stant returns  to private capital, broadly defined  to encompass  human 
and  nonhuman  capital. 
The  present  analysis  builds  on  both  aspects  of  this  literature  by 
incorporating  a public sector into a simple, constant-returns  model of 
economic  growth.  Because  of  familiar  externalities  associated  with 
public  expenditures  and  taxes,  the  privately  determined  values  of 
saving  and  economic  growth  may  be  suboptimal.  Hence  there  are 
interesting  choices  about  government  policies,  as  well  as empirical 
predictions  about  the  relations  among  the  size of  government,  the 
saving  rate, and  the rate of  economic  growth. 
I.  Endogenous  Growth  Models  with  Optimizing 
Households 
I begin  with  endogenous  growth  models  that build  on  constant  re- 
turns to a broad concept  of capital. The  representative,  infinite-lived 
household  in a closed  economy  seeks  to maximize  overall  utility, as 
given  by 
U=  {u(c)ePtdt,  (1) 
where  c is consumption  per person  and p >  0 is the constant  rate of 
time  preference.  Population,  which  corresponds  to  the  number  of 
workers  and consumers,  is constant.  I use  the utility function 
C1-  -  1  u(c)  =  -uo  (2) 
where  a  >  0, so that marginal  utility has the constant  elasticity  -(. 
Each household-producer  has access to the production  function 
y  = f(k),  (3) 
where y is output  per worker and k is capital per worker. Each person 
works a given amount  of time; that is, there is no labor-leisure choice. 
As is well known,  the maximization  of the representative  household's GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S 105 
overall utility in equation  (1) implies that the growth rate of consump- 
tion at each  point  in time is given  by 
c  Or  ((  P),  (4) 
where f'  is the  marginal  product  of capital. Instead  of  assuming  di- 
minishing  returns  (f" <  0), I follow  Rebelo  (1991)  by assuming  con- 
stant returns  to a broad  concept  of capital; that is, 
y  =  Ak,  (5) 
where A  >  0 is the constant  net  marginal  product  of capital.' 
The  assumption  of constant  returns becomes  more plausible when 
capital is viewed broadly to encompass  human and nonhuman  capital. 
Human  investments  include  education  and  training,  as well  as ex- 
penses  for having  and  raising children  (Becker and Barro  1988). Of 
course,  human  and nonhuman  capital need  not be perfect substitutes 
in  production.  Therefore,  production  may  show  roughly  constant 
returns  to scale in the two types of capital taken together  but dimin- 
ishing returns in either input separately. The Ak production  function 
shown  in  equation  (5)  can  be  modified  to  distinguish  between  two 
types  of  capital,  and  the  model  can be extended,  along  the  lines of 
Lucas (1988),  Rebelo  (1991),  and Becker,  Murphy, and Tamura  (this 
issue),  to allow for  sectors  that produce  physical and human  capital, 
respectively.  In comparison  with the Ak model,  the  main additional 
results  involve  transitional  dynamics  whereby  an  economy  moves 
from  an  arbitrary  starting  ratio  of  physical  to  human  capital  to  a 
steady-state  ratio. For studying  steady-state growth, however,  the im- 
portant  element  is constant  returns  to scale in the factors that can be 
accumulated-that  is,  the  two types  of  capital taken  together-and 
not  the distinction  between  the factors. 
Substitutingf'  =  A into equation  (4) yields 
w  =  6  =  1  * (A -  p),  (6)  C  OU 
where  the  symbol  y denotes  a per capita growth  rate. I assume  that 
the  technology  is  sufficiently  productive  to  ensure  positive  steady- 
state growth,  but not so productive  as to yield unbounded  utility. The 
corresponding  inequality  conditions  are 
' This  formulation  effectively  reverses  Solow's  (1956)  extension  of  the  Harrod 
(1 948)-Domar  (1947)  model to return to a setting with a fixed capital/output  ratio. The 
formulation  differs,  however,  from the Harrod-Domar  model in that saving choices are 
privately  optimal  (as in  the  analyses  of  Ramsey  [1928],  Cass [1965],  and  Koopmans 
[1965]). Sio6  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
A >  p >  A(1  -  or).  (7) 
The  first part implies  y >  0 in equation  (6). The  second  part, which is 
satisfied automatically  if A >  0, p >  0, and a  -  1, guarantees  that the 
attainable  utility is bounded. 
In  this  model  the  economy  is always at a position  of  steady-state 
growth in which all variables-c,  k, and y-grow  at the rate y shown in 
equation  (6). Given an initial capital stock, k(O), the levels of all vari- 
ables are also determined.2  In particular, since net investment  equals 
yk, the initial level  of  consumption  is 
c(0)  =  k(0)  (A  -  y).  (8) 
I now  modify  the  analysis to incorporate  a public sector.  Let g be 
the quantity of public services provided  to each household-producer. 
I assume  that  these  services  are provided  without  user charges  and 
are not subject to congestion  effects  (which might arise for highways 
or  some  other  public  services).  That  is,  the  model  abstracts  from 
externalities  associated  with the use of  public services. 
I consider  initially the role of public services as an input  to private 
production.  It is this productive  role that creates a potentially positive 
linkage  between  government  and  growth.  Production  now  exhibits 
constant  returns  to scale in k and g together  but diminishing  returns 
in k separately.  That  is, even  with a broad concept  of private capital, 
production  involves  decreasing  returns  to private inputs if the (com- 
plementary)  government  inputs  do not expand  in a parallel manner. 
In a recent  empirical  study, Aschauer  (1988)  argues  that the services 
from  government  infrastructure  are  particularly  important  in  this 
context. 
Given  constant  returns  to  scale,  the  production  function  can  be 
written  as 
y  =  F(k, g)  =  k  (g  (9) 
where  q) satisfies  the  usual  conditions  for  positive  and  diminishing 
marginal  products,  so that +'  >  0 and  +"  <  0.3  The  variable k is the 
2  With a perfect  capital  market  (and  given  constant  returns  to scale and  no adjust- 
ment  costs  for investment),  the  scale of  a competitive  firm would be indeterminate  in 
this model.  However,  the  aggregates  of  capital stock and investment  would  be deter- 
mined. 
3  Arrow and Kurz (1970,  chap. 4) assume  that public capital, rather than the flow of 
public  services,  enters  into  the  production  function.  Because  output  can be used  for 
consumption  or to augment  private or public capital and because the two capital stocks 
are  transferable  across  the  sectors,  this  difference  in  specification  is not  substantive. 
They  assume  also  that  the  flow of  services  from  public  capital enters  into  the  utility 
function,  a  possibility  that  I  analyze  later  on.  Their  analysis  differs  from  mine  in 
assuming  diminishing  returns to scale in private and public capital, given an exogenous GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S 107 
representative  producer's  quantity  of  capital,  which  would  corre- 
spond  to the per capita amount  of aggregate  capital. I assume  that g 
can be measured  correspondingly  by the per capita quantity of  gov- 
ernment  purchases  of goods  and services. In some of the subsequent 
analysis,  I assume  that the  production  function  is Cobb-Douglas,  so 
that 
k  +k)  (k)  0 
where  0 <  a  <  1. 
A number  of questions  arise concerning  the specification of public 
services as an input  to production.  First, the flow of services need  not 
correspond  to  government  purchases,  especially  when  the  govern- 
ment  owns  capital and  the national  accounts  omit an imputed  rental 
income  on  public  capital in the  measure  of  current  purchases.  This 
issue  is important  for  empirical  implementation  of  the  model.  But 
conceptually,  it is satisfactory to think of the government  as doing  no 
production  and owning  no capital. Then  the government just buys a 
flow  of  output  (including  services  of  highways,  sewers,  battleships, 
etc.)  from  the  private  sector.  These  purchased  services,  which  the 
government  makes  available to households,  correspond  to the input 
that  matters  for  private  production  in  equation  (9).  As  long  as the 
government  and  the  private  sector  have  the  same  production  func- 
tions,  the  results  would  be the  same if the  government  buys private 
inputs  and  does  its own production,  instead  of purchasing  only final 
output  from  the  private sector,  as I assume. 
A second  issue arises if public services are nonrival for the users (as 
is true, e.g.,  for the space program). Then  it is the total of government 
purchases,  rather  than  the amount  per capita, that matters for each 
individual.  As  is  well  known  at  least  since  Samuelson  (1954),  this 
element  is important  for  determining  the  desirable  scale of  govern- 
mental  activity.  My view  is that  few  actual government  services  (in- 
cluding,  as Thompson  [1974]  argues,  national  defense)  are nonrival. 
But  the  present  analysis  can  be  modified  to  include  this  aspect  of 
publicness  without  changing  the general  nature  of  the results. 
The  general  idea  of  including  g  as  a  separate  argument  of  the 
production  function  is that private inputs,  represented  by k, are not a 
close  substitute  for  public  inputs.  Private activity would  not  readily 
replace  public activity if user charges  were difficult  to implement,  as 
in the case of such nonexcludable  services as national defense  and the 
amount  of labor services (which corresponds  to population).  Therefore,  the per capita 
growth  rate in their model  depends  in the long  run entirely on the exogenous  rate of 
technological  progress. Sio8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
maintenance  of law and order.  In other cases, user charges would be 
undesirable,  either because the service is nonrival or because external 
effects  cause private production  to be too low (as is sometimes  argued 
for basic education). 
I assume  that government  expenditure  is financed  contemporane- 
ously  by a flat-rate income  tax 
g  =  T=  y=  Tr  k+  (11) 
where  T is government  revenue  and  v  is  the  tax  rate.  I  have  nor- 
malized  the  number  of  households  to unity so that g corresponds  to 
aggregate  expenditures  and T to aggregate  revenues.  Note that equa- 
tion (1 1) constrains the government  to run a balanced budget. That is, 
the  government  can neither  finance  deficits by issuing  debt  nor run 
surpluses  by accumulating  assets. 
The  production  function  in equation  (9) implies  that the marginal 
product  of  capital is 
ay  +(  (1  '  )  =  (1-  I  q),  (12) 
where -  is the elasticity  of y with respect to g (for a given value of k),  so 
that 0 < -q  <  1. Note that the marginal  product, aylak,  is calculated  by 
varying  k in equation (9), while holding g fixed. That is, the represen- 
tative producer assumes that changes in his quantity of capital and 
output do not lead to any changes in his amount of public services. 
Private  optimization still leads to a path of consumption that satis- 
fies equation (4), except that f' is replaced by the private marginal 
return to capital.  With the presence of a flat-rate  income tax at rate T, 
this return is (1 -  )  *  (aylak),  where aylak  is given from equation (12). 
Therefore, the growth rate of consumption is now 
=  C  = 
I 
*  (1  -  )  I  *  (I1  -  'q) -  P  (13) 
As long  as 7  and, hence,  gly are constants-that  is, the government 
sets g and T to grow at the same rate as  y-glk  and -q  and therefore the 
growth rate -y  will be constants.  Accordingly,  the dynamics  is the same 
as that for the Ak  model analyzed  before. Consumption  starts  at some 
value c(O)  and then grows at the constant rate y. Similarly,  k and y 
begin at initial values k(0) and y(O)  and then grow at the constant  rate 
y. The economy has no transitional  dynamics  and is always  in a posi- 
tion of steady-state  growth in which all quantities grow at the rate y 
shown in equation (13). 
Given a starting amount of capital, k(O),  the levels of all variables GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  8109 
are again  determined.  In particular, the initial quantity of consump- 
tion is 
c(0)  =  k()  * [(1  -  )  -  J  (14) 
where  y is given  in equation  (13). The  first term inside  the brackets 
of  equation  (14) corresponds  to y(O)  -  g(O), and the second  term to 
initial investment,  k(O). 
Different  sizes of governments-that  is, different  values for gly and 
7-have  two effects  on  the  growth  rate,  y, in equation  (13).  An  in- 
crease in T reduces  y, but an increase in gly raises aylak,  which raises -. 
Typically,  the second  force  dominates  when  the government  is small, 
and the first force dominates  when the government  is large. A simple 
example  is the Cobb-Douglas  technology,  in which  q-the  elasticity of 
y with respect to g-is  constant.  In this case, -q =  at,  where 0 <  a  <  1 in 
equation  (10). The  conditions  7  =  gly and gik  =  (gly) *  4(glk)  imply 
that the  derivative  of  y with respect  to gly is (when  q is constant) 
dy  -  1  *(  ((V -1).  (15) 
d(gly)  au 
Hence  the growth rate increases with gly if gik is small enough  so that 
V  >  1 and declines  with gly if gik is large enough  so that +' <  1. With 
a Cobb-Douglas  technology,  the  size of  government  that maximizes 
the  growth  rate corresponds  to the natural condition  for productive 
efficiency:  ('  =  1. Since a  =  q =  ('  * (gly), it follows that at =  gly  =  T. 
Roughly  speaking,  to maximize  the growth rate, the government  sets 
its share of gross national product, gly, to equal the share it would get 
if public  services  were  a competitively  supplied  input  of  production. 
The  solid curve  in figure  1 shows the relation between  the growth 
rate,  -y, and  the  tax  and  expenditure  rate,  7  =  gly,  for  the  Cobb- 
Douglas  case.  (The  graph  assumes  specific  numerical  values  for the 
parameters  at, A,  p,  and  a,  solely  for  illustrative  purposes.)  The 
growth  rate is positive  over some  range if the economy  is sufficiently 
productive  relative  to  the  rate  of  time  preference.  The  condition 
for  a  range  with  positive  growth  (which  generalizes  the  condition 
A >  p from  the Ak model)  is A'/(' -)  *  (1  -  ct)2 * ot/(  >  p. Also, 
as before,  I assume  that the  economy  is not so productive  that it al- 
lows  the  attained  utility  to  become  unbounded;  the  condition  here 
is p >  Al/(''t)  * (1  -  r)(1  -  ct)2  * ot0/('-'),  which must hold if A >  0, 
p >  0, and  :-  1. 
If the production  function  is not Cobb-Douglas,  the dependence  of 
,q on gik in equation  (13) affects  the results. The  condition  for max- 
imizing  the growth  rate can be expressed  in terms of the elasticity of Silo  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG.  1 -Growth  rate in three environments.  The  curves assume Cobb-Douglas tech- 
nology.  y is from eq. (13),  yp  from eq. (20), and  YL from eq. (22). Parameter values are 
a  =  1, (x  =  .25,  p  =  .02,  and  A1l'  =  .113.  These  values  imply  that  the  maximum  of 
,y is .02. 
substitution  between  the  factors  g  and  k. At  the  point  of  maximal 
growth,  the  marginal  product  of  public  services,  +',  turns out  to be 
above or below unity as the magnitude  of the elasticity of substitution 
(at the  point  of  maximal  growth)  is above or below one. 
The  saving rate is given  by 
s  k = kk  _  y  (16) 
y  k  y  4(g/k)'  (6 
where  My  is given  in  equation  (13).  The  solid  curve  in  figure  2 is a 
graph  of s versus  v  =  gly for the case of a Cobb-Douglas  technology. 
Because  kly declines  with gly, the saving rate peaks before  the growth 
rate.  That  is, a value  v  =  gly  <  at (corresponding  to +'  >  1) would 
maximize  s in the  Cobb-Douglas  case. 
There  is no  reason  for  the government  to maximize  y or s per se. 
For a benevolent  government,  the appropriate  objective in this model 
is to  maximize  the  utility  attained  by the  representative  household. 
Because  the economy  is always in a position  of steady-state growth, it 
is straightforward  to compute  the attained utility, as long as 7  =  gly  is 
constant over time. With y constant, the integral in equation (1) can be 
simplified  to yield  (aside  from  a constant) GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  Sill 
1 .0 
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I  =  .25  . 
-1  .0  L  _ 
.08  .16  .24  .32  .40  .48  .56  .64  .72  .80  .88  .96 
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(T  =  g/y) 
FIG. 2.-Saving  rate in three  environments.  The  curves assume Cobb-Douglas  tech- 
nology. s is from eq. (16), sp =  yp - (kly), and SL  =  YL  ' (kly), where yp  is from eq. (20) and 
YL from  eq. (22).  Parameter  values  are given  in fig.  1. 
=  (1  (O)] 
-  -  ([  ( 1  7) 
(I-u)[p  -  'y(l  -  u)]' 
The  condition  that  utility  be  bounded,  mentioned  before,  ensures 
that p >  y(l  -  a). 
Equations  (13) and (14) determine  y and c(O), respectively, as func- 
tions of  v  =  gly. Hence,  these  formulas  can be used to determine  the 
share of  government  in gross domestic  product  that maximizes  U in 
equation  (17).  To  see  the  nature  of  the  results,  note  that equations 
(13) and  (14) imply  that c(O) can be written as 
c(O)  k  (O)  * [p +  Ay (a  +  a  -  1)].  (18) 
1 -  i 
Substituting  into  equation  (17) yields a relation between  U and y: 
U-  L  k(O)1  .  (  p  +  y=  ?  U  -1)  (19) 
I  -  Id  (I  -  u)[p  -  y(1  a)], 
If q is constant (with 0 <  q <  1), it can be shown that the effect of My  on 
U in equation  (19) is positive for all values of a >  0, as long as utility is 
bounded,  so  that  p  >  y(l  -  ().  (This  result  applies  although  an 
increase  in  y need  not  raise c(O) in eq.  [18].) Therefore,  if -  is con- S1  12  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
stant, the maximization  of  U corresponds  to the maximization of 'y. It 
follows  that the  productive-efficiency  condition,  4)' =  1 (and, corre- 
spondingly,  v  =  gly  =  at), determines  the relative size of government 
that maximizes  utility if the  technology  is Cobb-Douglas. 
The  conclusions  would  again  be modified  if the  production  func- 
tion  is not Cobb-Douglas.  The  relative size of government  that max- 
imizes utility turns out to exceed  the value that maximizes the growth 
rate  (i.e.,  dy/d[g/y]  <  0 applies)  if and  only  if the  magnitude  of  the 
elasticity of  substitution  between  g and k is greater  than unity. 
II.  A Planning  Problem  for the Government 
The  results  on  the  size  of  government  in  the  previous  section  are 
solutions  to  second-best  policy  problems.  Because  of  familiar exter- 
nalities  implied  by public  expenditures  and  taxation,  the  decentral- 
ized  choices  of  saving  turn  out  to  generate  outcomes  that  are  not 
Pareto  optimal.  In  fact,  the  departures  from  Pareto  optimality  are 
analogous  to those  in the  Arrow  (1962)-Romer  (1986)  learning-by- 
doing  models,  which  relied  on  the  public-goods  nature  of  privately 
created  knowledge. 
The  easiest  way  to  assess  the  external  effects  is  to  compare  the 
decentralized  outcomes  with those from an unrealistic planning  prob- 
lem.  Suppose  that  the  government  chooses  a constant  expenditure 
ratio, gly, and can then dictate each household's  choices for consump- 
tion  over  time.  (It is straightforward  to  show  that a constant  gly  is 
optimal  in this planning  problem.)  Given a value of g/y-which,  for 
the moment,  I treat as arbitrary-the  government  picks the consump- 
tion  path  to  maximize  the  representative  household's  attained  util- 
ity, where the expression  for utility is again given in equations (1) and 
(2). The  resulting  condition  for the planned  growth rate of consump- 
tion  is 
=P  -  C1  -  -(  )I-?  -  Pa  (20) 
The  term  inside  the brackets and to the left of the minus  sign is the 
social marginal  return  on capital, given that the expenditure  ratio, gly, is 
constant. Note  that,  to  maintain  gly,  an increase  in y by one  unit re- 
quires an increase  in g by gly units. Since the increase in g comes out 
of the current  output  stream, the term 4(glk),  which is the effect of k 
on y, is adjusted by the factor  1 -  (gly) to calculate the social return on 
capital. 
The  condition  gik  =  (gly) *(g/k)  implies  that the derivative of yyp 
from  equation  (20) with respect  to gly is GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S113 
dyyp  -  (glk)  -  1) 
d(g/y)  ul-~)(1 
Because  0 <  q <  1, the  condition  I'  =  1 corresponds  to maximum 
growth  irrespective  of  the  form  of  the production  function.  That  is, 
under  planning,  the productive-efficiency  condition  for g must hold. 
It can also be shown that maximizing  growth corresponds  to maximiz- 
ing utility in the planning  case. Hence,  the optimizing  planner sets gly 
so that 4'  =  1, regardless  of  the  form of  the production  function. 
In equation  (13), the expression  within the brackets and to the left 
of  the minus  sign is the private marginal  return on capital, (1  -  T)  - 
(dyldk).  In contrast, as noted  before,  the corresponding  term in equa- 
tion  (20) is the  social marginal  return  on capital. Hence,  with a pro- 
portional  income  tax  at  rate  T  =  gly,  the  difference  between  the 
private choice  in equation  (13) and the planning  solution  in equation 
(20) is the  presence  of the term  1 -  -q  in the former.  Thus  it is clear 
that  yp  exceeds  y for all values of gly  =  T.  Because of the income  tax, 
the decentralized  choices  of consumption  and saving lead to too little 
growth. 
The  dotted  curve  in  figure  1 shows  how gly affects  the  planning 
growth  rate,  yp, for  the  case  of  a  Cobb-Douglas  technology.  (The 
corresponding  saving rate appears  in fig. 2.) Since the decentralized 
growth  rate y in equation  (13) differs  from  the planning  growth rate 
yp  in equation  (20) only by the presence  of the term 1 -  Aq,  it follows- 
if  q is constant-that  the  shape  of  the  graph  of  yp versus gly is the 
same as that of y. Thus  both curves peak at the point at which 4'  =  1 
and gly  =  at. Although  growth  is too  low in the  decentralized  case, 
with a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  the value of gly that max- 
imizes  growth  (and  utility)  is the  same  as that in  the  planning  op- 
timum. 
It  is natural  to  consider  whether  the  command  optimum  can  be 
implemented  by replacing  the income  tax with a lump-sum  tax in an 
environment  of decentralized  households.  (In this model,  which lacks 
a labor-leisure  choice,  a consumption  tax  would  be  equivalent  to  a 
lump-sum  tax.) With lump-sum  taxes, the private marginal return on 
capital  is  dy/dk rather  than  (1  -  T)  .  (dy/dk). Therefore,  instead  of 
equation  (13), optimizing  households  would choose the growth rate of 
consumption 
YL  =  -  q) -  p]  (22) 
Thus  YL differs  from  y by the absence  of  the term  1  -  T  inside  the 
brackets. 
The  dashed  curve in figure  1 graphs  YL as a function  of gly for the Si 14  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
case  of  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  As  is  apparent  from 
equation  (22),  YL  is  monotonically  increasing  in gly because  a higher 
gly means  a higher  marginal  product  of  capital, dy/dk.  With a lump- 
sum tax, households  respond  to the higher return on capital by choos- 
ing a higher  growth  rate for consumption  (and a higher  saving rate; 
see  fig. 2). 
A comparison  of equations  (20) and (22) indicates  that -yp  contains 
the term  1 -  (gly) where  YL contains  the term  1 -  q. Since  q =  +'  - 
(gly), productive  efficiency  (4'  =  1) implies  q =  gly. Therefore,  the 
terms  1 -  (gly) and  1 -  q coincide  at this point. It follows that lump- 
sum taxation  supports  the command  optimum  if gly is set optimally, 
so that 4'  =  1.4 
If  the  expenditure  share  is set  nonoptimally  so  that 4'  $  1, the 
planning  solution  for  consumption-contingent  on  this  incorrect 
choice  of  g/y-does  not  coincide  with the  solution  under  lump-sum 
taxation.  This  result  indicates  that  the  income  tax  is  not  the  only 
distortion  in the model.  I am uncertain whether the other distortion is 
economically  interesting,  but I shall now explain  what it is. 
An  individual  producer  computes  the  marginal  product,  dy/dk, 
while  holding  constant  the  quantity of  public  services, g, that he  re- 
ceives from the government.  This assumption  is appropriate  for some 
types of  public services, and I maintain this assumption  for now. But 
if  the  government  sets a given  expenditure  ratio gly,  an increase  in 
national  product  by  one  unit  induces  the  government  to  raise  the 
aggregate  of its public services by gly units. Thus  when an individual 
producer  decides  to raise his individual  k and y, he is indirectly caus- 
ing the government  to increase its aggregate  spending.  The  effect on 
that  individual's  public  services,  which  entered  into  his  production 
function,  would  be negligible  (under  my assumption  about how pub- 
lic  services  are  provided)  and  can  therefore  be  ignored.  But  it  is 
nevertheless  true,  with  gly  fixed,  that  an  individual's  decision  that 
4 This  result under  lump-sum  taxation  implies  that the solution  T  =  gly  =  at is time 
consistent  under  income  taxation and a Cobb-Douglas  technology.  Suppose  that future 
governments  will set the income  tax rate, T(t) =  at, for all t >  0. Then,  for given k(O),  the 
current  income  tax rate,  r(O), is effectively  a lump-sum  tax. In particular, the current 
choice  affects  neither  past investments  (which cannot be undone)  nor expected  future 
tax rates (which  matter  for current  and  future  investment).  If the  government  could 
run budget  surpluses  and thereby  accumulate  assets, it would be attractive to choose  a 
very high  value of T(0)  and use the proceeds  to finance future  spending  (which other- 
wise  would  require  distorting  income  taxation).  However,  the  balanced-budget  con- 
straint  in  eq.  (11)  rules  out  this  possibility.  Therefore,  the  government  selects  the 
current  tax and expenditure  ratio, T(O) =  g(O)/y(O),  as it would  under  lump-sum  taxa- 
tion.  But  the  solution  to this  problem  is  r(O) =  g(O)/y(O) =  at. In the absence  of  the 
balanced-budget  constraint,  the  government  would  have the usual incentive  to effect 
capital  levies,  so that  T(t)  =  at would  no  longer  be time  consistent.  (Private investors 
would  also anticipate  these  levies and act accordingly.)  The  result  (t) =  at would then 
hinge  on  the  government's  ability (starting  from  time  t  =  -oo)  to commit  itself  to a 
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raises  national  product  by one  unit  causes  the  total of  government 
purchases  to  expand  by gly  units.  The  effects  depend  on  whether 
the  size  of  the  government  is optimal.  If  so-namely,  at the  point 
4)' =  1-a  marginal  change  in  government  expenditures  is just 
worth  its cost.  Hence  there  is no  distortion,  and  the  lump-sum  tax 
result replicates the planning  optimum,  as noted before.  But suppose 
that the  government  is too  large,  in the sense  that 4)'  <  1. Then  the 
induced  expansion  of  government  expenditures  constitutes  a nega- 
tive externality.  On this count, each individual has too much incentive 
to expand  individual  output;  in particular,  in this model,  each  indi- 
vidual  has too much  incentive  to save. Hence  (for the Cobb-Douglas 
case), gly >  ax  implies YL  >  yp in figure 1 and SL  >  Sp  in figure 2. 
Analogously,  the  incentive  to  expand  individual  output  is too  low 
when the government  is too small (4'>  1). Hence,  YL <  yp and SL  <  Sp 
apply in this range. 
Figures  1 and  2 also allow a comparison  between  lump-sum  taxes 
(which could  be consumption  taxes in this model)  and income  taxes. 
At  the  point  gly  =  a  (in the  Cobb-Douglas  case), the lump-sum  tax 
generates  the  command  optimum  and  is therefore  superior  to  the 
income  tax.  For gly  <  a,  the  lump-sum  tax  comes  closer  than  the 
income  tax to the  command  optimum;  therefore,  the lump-sum  tax 
would  also be preferred  here.  However,  for gly >  (x, the comparison 
becomes  ambiguous  because  the lump-sum  tax choices,  YL and SL,  are 
too large, while the income  tax choices,  y and s, are too small. For very 
large governments  (i.e., gly well above a), the outcome  under  income 
taxes  can  be  superior  to  that under  lump-sum  taxes.  The  reason  is 
that the income  tax is an imperfect  way to get individual producers  to 
internalize  the distortion  described  above. With gly >  a,  people  have 
too great an incentive  to expand  output by an additional unit because 
the government  is thereby  induced  to increase its expenditures  by gly 
units.  If government  spending  were worthless,  the way to internalize 
this distortion  would be to tax the individual's income  at the rate X  = 
gly.  As gly  gets  well  above  its ideal  value,  ax,  the  return  from  more 
government  spending,  4)',  diminishes;  that is, it becomes  more nearly 
accurate that government  spending  is worthless at the margin. There- 
fore,  the income  tax becomes  more nearly the right way to offset  the 
negative  externality,  and the value  y in figure  1 gets steadily closer to 
the value  yp.  Similarly, in figure 2, s and sp converge  as gly approaches 
one. 
III.  Tax  Systems  and  Property  Rights 
Within  the  framework  of  an income  tax, the  (average)  marginal  tax 
rate,  T,  can  vary  for  a  given  expenditure  ratio,  gly.  For  example, 
differences  in  the  degree  of  graduation  or  in  enforcement  policies Si 16  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
could  generate  these variations in T.  If T decreases,  for a given gly, the 
response  is a movement  in the direction  from the solid to the dashed 
curve  (i.e.,  from  y to  YL)  in figures  1 and 2. Hence,  for given gly, the 
rates of  growth  and  saving increase. 
From  the  standpoint  of  investors,  enhanced  property  rights  look 
like reductions  in marginal  tax rates. Therefore,  an improvement  in 
property  rights also generates  a shift in the direction from the solid to 
the dashed  curve  in figures  1 and  2. Hence,  the rates of growth and 
saving  again  increase. 
Many  functions  of  government,  such  as maintenance  of  law and 
order  and  national  security,  help  to sustain property  rights. (Others, 
including  some  regulatory  and  legislative  activities,  have  opposing 
effects.)  An  increase  in spending,  g,  in areas that enhance  property 
rights causes a reduction  in the effective  value of T rather than a direct 
effect  on  the  production  function.  However,  the  effects  on  growth 
and saving are similar to those for the productive  government  expen- 
ditures  considered  before.  In  particular,  the  relation  of  growth  and 
saving rates to the amount of government  expenditure  devoted  to the 
enforcement  of  property  rights  would  resemble  the  solid  curves 
shown  in figures  1 and  2. 
IV.  An  Alternative  Specification  for  Public 
Services 
Thus  far, each individual  held fixed his quantity of public services, g, 
when considering  a change  in his quantity of capital, k, and output, y. 
This setting is appropriate  for some public services but not for others. 
For example,  for police and fire protection,  and perhaps for national 
defense,  the  amount  of  public  services  that an individual  receives  is 
roughly  proportional  to the amount  of  property  that the person  has 
to protect.  (Thompson  [1974]  argues  that an increase  in an individ- 
ual's appropriable  property  makes the home  country  more attractive 
to foreign  aggressors  and thereby increases  the home  country's over- 
all burden  for  providing  national  security.)  These  cases can  be  ap- 
proximated  by assuming  that each individual  holds constant his ratio 
of  public  services  to output,  gly,  rather  than  his level  of  public ser- 
vices. 
With a flat-rate income  tax at rate 7,  the  individual's  optimization 
problem  now coincides  with the planner's problem considered  before. 
Hence  (for  the  case  in  which  public  services  appear  directly  in the 
production  function),  the  decentralized  choices  lead  to  the  growth 
rate  yp  shown in figure  1 and the saving rate sp shown in figure 2. The 
private  choices  lead  to a Pareto optimum  because  the income  tax at 
rate  T  =  gly  works  like  a  user  fee  to  internalize  the  effect  of  an GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S1 17 
individual's  choices  on  his  level  of  public  services.  In  particular,  a 
decision  to raise y by one unit (by an increase in k) leads to increases in 
own  public  services  and  taxes  by T units.  Since individuals  are effec- 
tively paying  for the services they receive,  a Pareto optimum  results. 
V.  Government  Consumption  Services 
I now return to the setting in which each individual holds constant his 
level  of  public  services.  But  suppose  that the government's  expendi- 
tures  also  finance  some  services  that  enter  into  households'  utility 
functions.  I assume that total spending  per household  is g  +  h, where 
the  quantity  h  represents  the  government's  consumption  services. 
The  utility function  for each  household  is now 
u(ch)-  (cl'-  0)--  1  (23) 
1  -  cr 
where  0  <  3  <  1.  The  household's  overall  utility  is  still  given  by 
equation  (1), except  that u(c, h) replaces  u(c) in the integral. 
I still assume a flat-rate income tax, so that the government's  budget 
constraint  is 
T=  (Tg+h)T,  (24) 
where  Tg  =  gly is the government's  expenditure  ratio for productive 
services,  and  Th  =  hly is the  ratio for consumption  services. 
Households'  decentralized  choices  for  consumption  and  saving 
(with g and h taken as given)  now lead  to the growth  rate 
Yh  =  -  (I  Tg  -  Th)  ()  )  J  (25) 
This  expression  modifies  equation  (13) in a straightforward  manner. 
The  dotted  curve  in figure  3 shows  the  relation  between  Yh and  the 
share of productive  government  spending,  Tg =  gly, taking account of 
the  positive  value  of  Th  =  hly. The  growth  rate lies uniformly  below 
the value ry,  shown by the solid curve, that would have been chosen  if 
Th  =  0. Figure  4 shows the corresponding  saving rates, Sh and s. 
For a given  Th and a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  it is easy to 
show that the value  of  Tg  =  gly that maximizes  Yh in equation  (25) is 
(  -  TO-).  In other  words,  the growth-maximizing  share of  produc- 
tive government  spending  is smaller if the  government  is also using 
the  income  tax  to  finance  other  types  of  spending.  However,  this 
choice  turns out not to maximize  the utility attained by the represen- 
tative household. 
Suppose  that each household's  utility function  is given by equation 
(23) and that Tg  =  gly and Th  =  h/y are set to maximize the overall S  118  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG. 3.-Growth  when the government  also provides consumption  services. -y  is from 
eq. (1 3) and  Yh  from eq. (25). The  graph of  Yh  assumes Th =  .15. Other parameter values 
are from  fig.  1. 
utility attained  by the representative  household  in the form of equa- 
tion  (1).  (I again  restrict attention  to expenditure  and  tax rates that 
are constant over time.) The  effects of the tax rates on Yh are shown in 
equation  (25). As before,  it is possible to determine  the initial level of 
consumption,  c(O), and thereby calculate the entire path of consump- 
tion  as c(t)  =  c(O)  *  eYht.  The  path of  the  government's  consumption 
services is given by h(t)  =  Th * y(t)  =  Th  *  y(O)eeht.  With these results, it is 
feasible to relate the attained utility, U, to the expenditure  ratios Tg  = 
gly  and  Th  =  hly. There  are  then  two  first-order  conditions  corre- 
sponding  to the  maximization  of  U. Combining  these  conditions  for 
the case of a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  leads to the familiar 
result:  Tg  =  gly  =  ot. That  is,  as  long  as  Th  =  hly is  also  chosen 
optimally,  the optimal  ratio for productive  government  expenditures 
is the  same  as before.  Namely,  the  criterion  is still productive  effi- 
ciency,  so that 4'  =  1 and gly  =  ot. 
VI.  Self-interested  Government 
Thus  far, I assumed  that the government  was benevolent  and there- 
fore  sought  to  maximize  the  utility  attained  by  the  representative 
household.  I now consider  the alternative that the government  is run 
by an agent who has no electoral constraints and seeks to maximize his 
own  utility. GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S119 
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FIG. 4.-Saving  rate when  the  government  also provides  consumption  services. s is 
from eq. (16); Sh  =  Yh ' (kly),  where  Yh is from eq. (25); and Th  =  .15. Other parameter 
values  are from  fig.  1. 
Return  to  the  setting  in  which  all  government  expenditures,  g, 
serve  as  productive  inputs  for  private  producers.  The  government 
still uses a flat-rate income  tax, but instead of automatically balancing 
the budget,  the  government  can earn  the  net revenue 
Cg  (-  )y  (26) 
where the expenditure  ratio gly can differ  from the income tax rate T. 
The  government  agent  uses his net revenue  to purchase the quantity 
of consumer  goods,  cg. The agent receives utility from consumption  in 
the  same  manner  as any household;  that is, the  flow of  utils is u(cg) 
from  equation  (2), and  the overall attained  utility, U, is given  by the 
integral  in equation  (1).  In  addition,  the  government  agent  has the 
same discount  rate, p, as each  household. 
With constant values for T and gly, the privately determined  growth 
rate is still the value  y from equation  (13). The  only difference  is that 
gly no longer equals T. The  government  agent's consumption  is cg(t)  = 
[T  -  (gly)]  y(O)elt.  Therefore,  it  is  possible  to  write the  agent's at- 
tained  utility as a function  of  T and gly. For a Cobb-Douglas  produc- 
tion  function,  the  two first-order  conditions  for maximization  of the 
agent's  utility lead  to the  results 
T >~-  9  =  (X.  (27) 
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The optimal expenditure  rate gly equals  a, as in previous models; that 
is, the  productive-efficiency  condition,  4'  =  1, still holds.  Since the 
choice  of gly is mainly one  of efficient  production,  the self-interested 
government  chooses  the  same  value  as the  benevolent  government. 
Basically, the government  agent sets gly  =  a to maximize the tax base 
that he has to work with. Then  he is also in the position to set T >  gly 
to secure  the  net  flow of  revenue,  cg. 
The  results  in this section  parallel those  in the  preceding  one.  In 
effect,  the  government  agent's  consumption,  cg,  plays the  same role 
that the government's  consumption  services, h, played in the previous 
model.  In both  cases  the  presence  of  these  consumption  flows does 
not  upset  the  conditions  for  productive  efficiency,  which imply (for 
Cobb-Douglas  technology)  that the  government's  productive  expen- 
ditures  are the fraction  a of total output.  However,  the ratio of gov- 
ernment  revenues  to output  exceeds  a in both situations: in one case 
to provide  consumption  to the government  agent and in the other to 
provide  government  consumption  services to each household. 
VII.  Some  Empirical  Implications 
The  theory  has implications  for relations between  the size of govern- 
ment and the rates of growth and saving. Because the analysis applies 
to steady-state  growth  paths, the natural empirical application would 
be to differences  in average  performance  across countries  over long 
periods  of  time. 
As is usual  in empirical  investigations,  the hypothesized  effects  of 
government  policy are easier to assess if the government's  actions can 
be  treated  as exogenous.  That  is,  the  results  are  simple  if  govern- 
ments  randomize  their  actions  and  thereby  generate  useful  experi- 
mental data. In this case, variations in the share of productive govern- 
ment expenditures  in GDP, gly, affect the growth and saving rates, Yh 
and Sh, as shown by the dashed  curves in figures 3 and 4, respectively. 
(The  precise  curves apply with a proportional  income  tax and Cobb- 
Douglas  production  function  and in settings in which individuals treat 
their  own  allocations  of  public  services,  g  and  h, as given.)  As sug- 
gested  before,  productive  government  spending  would  include  the 
resources  devoted  to property  rights enforcement,  as well as activities 
that enter  directly  into  production  functions.  Countries  could  be ar- 
rayed along the horizontal  axes by the size of gly, and the responses of 
y and s would  be nonmonotonic,  as shown  in the figures. 
An  increase  in  the  share  of  nonproductive  government  expendi- 
tures,  say hly in the  model  of  Section  V, leads  to the  types of  shifts 
shown  by  the  movements  from  the  solid  to  the  dashed  curves  in 
figures  3 and 4. For a given value of gly, an increase in hly lowers the GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S121 
growth  and saving rates. These  effects  arise because a higher  hly has 
no  direct  effect  on  private-sector  productivity,  but  does  lead  to  a 
higher  income  tax rate. Since individuals  retain a smaller fraction of 
their returns  from  investment,  they have less incentive  to invest, and 
the economy  tends  to grow  at a lower rate. 
The  predictions  are similar for any other  differences  across coun- 
tries that imply that private investors get to retain a smaller fraction of 
their  returns  from  investment.  For example,  if gly is held  fixed,  an 
increase  in the average  marginal tax rate or an exogenous  worsening 
of  property  rights  would  tend  to lower the growth and saving rates. 
Aside  from  problems  of  measuring  public services and the rates of 
growth  and  saving,  the  empirical  implementation  of  the  model  is 
complicated  by the endogeneity  of the government.  Within the theo- 
retical  model  (and  with  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function),  the 
government  sets the share of productive  expenditures,  gly, to ensure 
productive  efficiency  (4'  =  1). Therefore,  instead  of  being  arrayed 
along  the horizontal  axes in figures  3 and 4, each government  would 
operate  at the same point, gly  =  a. Within this framework of optimiz- 
ing governments,  cross-sectional variations in gly arise only if a differs 
from  country  to country. 
The  parameter  a,  which  measures  the  productivity  of  public ser- 
vices  relative  to  private  services,  could  vary  across  countries  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  These  include  geography,  the  share of  agricul- 
tural production,  urban density,  and so on. For present purposes  it is 
unnecessary  to predict  how any specific element  would affect a,  and 
therefore  gly, for an optimizing  government.  As long as the variations 
in a are independent  of the overall level of  productivity,5 the model 
predicts  how the induced  variations in gly will correlate with those in 
y  The  result is that a rise in a, and hence  in gly, will reduce  Y.6 The 
intuition  is that an increase in ao  means a shift in relative productivity 
toward the factor g that has to be financed by a distorting tax. It is for 
this  reason  that  a higher  a  correlates  negatively  with y  The  more 
general  conclusion  is  that  gly  and  y  would  show  little  correlation 
across countries  because  each government  goes to the point at which 
the  marginal  effect  of gly on  y is close to zero. 
For government  expenditures  that provide  only consumption  ser- 
vices,  the  implications  are  more  straightforward.  Variations  in  the 
expenditure  share for government  consumption,  h/y-viewed  as gen- 
erated  from  differences  in preferences  for public versus private ser- 
' For a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  ylk  =  A(glk)c from eq. (10). The  condi- 
tion  gik  =  (g/y)  - (y/k) implies  ylk  =  A"'  -)(g/y)(XI(l -O.  Therefore,  the  parameter 
Al('  - 
-  indicates  the  level  of  private  productivity,  y/k, for  a given  value  of gly. The 
assumption  is that cross-sectional  variations in A'  (1  -  are independent  of those in at. 
6 The  saving  rate s also declines  if  y >  0. S122  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
vices  (the  parameter  13 in  eq.  [23])-correlate  negatively  with  the 
growth  and  saving  rates. 
VIII.  Empirical  Results  on Government 
and  Growth 
The  literature  includes  a number of empirical studies on the relation- 
ship between  government  and economic  growth.  Kormendi  and Me- 
guire  (1985)  studied  47  countries  in the  post-World  War II period, 
using  data  on  total  government  "consumption"  expenditures  and 
other  variables  from  International Financial  Statistics. This  measure 
of  government  spending  excludes  public  investment  and  transfers 
but includes  most expenditures  on defense  and education.  Although 
the  category  is called  consumption,  it does  not  necessarily  follow- 
especially  for defense  and education-that  these public services enter 
mainly into utility functions  rather than into production  functions  or 
as  influences  on  property  rights.  Using  data  for  each  country  av- 
eraged  over  roughly  20-year  periods,  Kormendi  and Meguire  found 
no significant  relation between  average growth rates of real GDP and 
average  growth  rates or levels of the share of government  consump- 
tion  spending  in GDP (p.  147). 
Grier and Tullock  (1987) extended  the Kormendi-Meguire  form of 
analysis to 115 countries,  using data on government  consumption  and 
other  variables  from  Summers  and  Heston  (1984).  The  concept  of 
government  spending  is the same as that employed  by Kormendi and 
Meguire.  The  Grier-Tullock  study  was a pooled  cross-section,  time- 
series analysis, using data averaged  over 5-year intervals. They  found 
a significantly  negative  relation between  the growth of real GDP and 
the  growth  of  the  government  share  of  GDP, although  most of  the 
relation  derived  from  the  24 OECD countries  (their tables  1 and 2). 
Landau  (1983)  studied  104  countries  on  a  cross-sectional  basis, 
using  an  earlier  form  of  the  Summers-Heston  data.  He  found  sig- 
nificantly negative  relations between  the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita  and  the  level  of  government  consumption  expenditures  as a 
ratio to GDP (table  1). His definition  of  government  consumption  is 
again  the  same  as those  used  above.  However,  his regressions  held 
constant  a measure  of  investment  in education,  which would  be one 
component  of  an economy's  broadly  defined  investment.  Since one 
channel  for a negative  effect  of more government  on growth involves 
a reduction  in investment,  the interpretation  is different  if a compo- 
nent  of  investment  is held  constant. 
Barth  and  Bradley  (1987,  table  1) found  a  negative  relation  be- 
tween  the  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  and  the  share  of  government 
consumption  spending  for  16 OECD countries  in the  period  1971- GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S 123 
83. They  also found  that the share of government  investment  in GDP 
had  a statistically insignificant  effect  on  growth,  although  the  point 
estimate  was  positive.  However,  the  last estimate  applies  when  the 
ratio of  private investment  to GDP is held  constant. 
In a recent  study of 98 countries  in the post-World  War II period 
(Barro 1989), I modified  the Summers-Heston  (1988) data on govern- 
ment consumption.  For the period  1970-85,  1 subtracted the ratios to 
GDP  of  government  spending  on  defense  and  education  from  the 
ratios reported  by Summers  and Heston.7 The  average value for each 
country  from  1970 to  1985, denoted  by gC/y,  was used as a proxy for 
the government  spending  ratio, hly, that enters directly into the utility 
function  in  the  theoretical  model.  The  identification  of  gC  with h is 
imperfect;  for  example,  police  services  (a component  of  gC)  would 
influence  property  rights  and  thereby  affect  private investment  and 
growth. 
I  also  measured  the  ratio  of  real  public  gross  investment  to  real 
GDP, denoted  by g'/y.  This  public investment  corresponds  to a stock 
of  public capital, kg, which  generates  a flow of services that I view as 
comparable  to the  productive  services g in the theory.  Thus  this em- 
pirical  measure  identifies  g  with  "infrastructure  services,"  such  as 
transportation,  water,  electric  power,  and  so on  (although  hospitals 
and schools are also components  of public capital). As with the identi- 
fication  of  gC with  h, the  identification  of  the  flow  of  services  from 
public capital with productive  government  services is imperfect. 
In the model,  where  public capital is combined  with private capital 
(because public and private production  are viewed as governed  by the 
same  production  function),  the "public capital stock" corresponds  to 
the fraction of the total stock, k, that produces  the public services; that 
is, kg =  (gly)  k. Hence,  gly can be measured  by the ratio kglk. Since 
data on kg and k are unavailable for most countries,  I instead approxi- 
mated kglk by the ratio of gross investments,  g1/i, where i is the sum of 
private  and  public  investment.  The  assumptions  here  are that gly is 
constant over time for a single country, and public and private capital 
have  the  same  depreciation  rates. According  to the theory,  the rela- 
tion of the growth rate My  to g'/i  depends  on how governments  behave. 
If governments  optimize  (go close to the point of maximal growth), My 
and  g1i1 would  show  little  cross-sectional  correlation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  association  would  be positive  (or negative)  if governments 
typically choose  too little (or too much) of productive  public services. 
7For  defense  and  education,  the  ratios were  nominal  spending  relative to nominal 
GDP, whereas the Summers-Heston  figures are real spending  relative to real GDP. The 
implicit assumption  (generated  by lack of an alternative) is that the appropriate deflator 
for defense  and education  is the  GDP deflator. S124  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
For the 98 countries  for which gC/y  was measured  (Barro 1989, table 
1), a regression  of  the average  annual  growth  rate of real per capita 
GDP from  1960 to  1985 on a set of explanatory  variables8 yielded  an 
estimated  coefficient  on  gC/y  of  -.12  (standard  error  =  .03).  Thus 
there  is an indication  that an increase  in resources  devoted  to non- 
productive  (but possibly utility-enhancing)  government  services is as- 
sociated  with lower  per capita growth. 
For  the  76  countries  for  which  data  on  public  investment  were 
available, the estimated coefficient  on g'/i  was .014 (s.e.  =  .022). Thus 
the point estimate was positive but insignificantly different  from zero. 
This  result  is consistent  with the  hypothesis  that the  typical country 
comes  close  to the  quantity  of  public investment  that maximizes  the 
growth  rate. 
If  the  ratio  of  public  investment  to GDP,  g'/y,  replaces  g'li  as an 
explanatory  variable in the growth equation,  the estimated coefficient 
is again  positive  but insignificant:  .13  (s.e.  =  .10).  Moreover,  if the 
variable ily is also included  as a regressor,  the estimated coefficient  of 
ily is .073 (s.e. =  .039), and that for g1/y  becomes -  .015 (s.e. =  .119). 
From the standpoint  of the theory,  the positive coefficient  on ily can 
be interpreted  as the  common  influence  of  omitted  variables on  in- 
vestment  and growth.  In any event, once the total investment  ratio il/ 
is held constant, there is no separate effect  on growth from the break- 
down  of  total investment  between  private and  public components. 
These  empirical  results are representative  of ongoing  research  on 
the  determinants  of  economic  growth  across countries.  Aside  from 
the  role  of  government,  this  research  is currently  focusing  on  the 
effects  of  human  capital,  market  distortions,  and  political  stability. 
Results of  this research  will be reported  in subsequent  papers. 
References 
Arrow,  Kenneth  J.  "The  Economic  Implications  of  Learning  by Doing."  Rev. 
Econ.  Studies  29  (June  1962):  155-73. 
Arrow,  Kenneth J.,  and Kurz, Mordecai. Public Investment,  the Rate of Return, 
and  Optimal  Fiscal  Policy.  Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Press  (for  Re- 
sources  for  the  Future),  1970. 
Aschauer,  David  A.  "Is  Public  Expenditure  Productive?"  Manuscript.  Chi- 
cago:  Fed.  Reserve  Bank  Chicago,  March  1988. 
Barro,  Robert  J.  "Economic  Growth  in  a Cross  Section  of  Countries."  Work- 
ing  Paper  no.  3120.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  NBER,  September  1989. 
Barth,  James  R.,  and  Bradley,  Michael  D.  "The  Impact  of  Government 
8  The  regression  also included  the  initial (1960)  values of  real per capita GDP and 
school  enrollment  rates  (intended  as proxies  for  initial human  capital) and  variables 
that measure  political stability and  market distortions.  See Barro (1989)  for details. GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  S125 
Spending  on Economic  Activity." Manuscript.  Washington:  George  Wash- 
ington  Univ.,  1987. 
Becker,  Gary S.,  and  Barro,  Robert J.  "A Reformulation  of  the  Economic 
Theory  of  Fertility." Q.J.E. 103 (February  1988):  1-25. 
Becker,  Gary S.; Murphy,  Kevin M.; and Tamura,  Robert. "Human Capital, 
Fertility, and  Economic  Growth."J.P.E.,  this issue. 
Cass, David. "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative  Model of Capital Accumu- 
lation." Rev. Econ. Studies 32 (July  1965):  233-40. 
Domar,  Evsey  D.  "Expansion  and  Employment."  A.E.R.  37  (March  1947): 
34-55. 
Grier,  Kevin  B.,  and  Tullock,  Gordon.  "An  Empirical  Analysis  of  Cross- 
national Economic  Growth,  1950-1980."  Manuscript. Pasadena: California 
Inst. Tech.,  December  1987. 
Harrod,  Roy F. Towards  a Dynamic  Economics:  Some  Recent  Developments  of Eco- 
nomic Theory  and Their Application to Policy. London:  Macmillan,  1948. 
Koopmans,  Tjalling  C. "On the  Concept  of  Optimal  Economic  Growth." In 
The  Econometric Approach to  Development Planning.  Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland,  1965. 
Kormendi,  Roger  C., and Meguire,  Philip G. "Macroeconomic  Determinants 
of  Growth:  Cross-Country  Evidence." J.  Monetary Econ.  16  (September 
1985):  141-63. 
Landau,  Daniel  L.  "Government  Expenditure  and  Economic  Growth:  A 
Cross-Country  Study." Southern  Econ. J.  49  (January  1983): 783-92. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. "On the Mechanics of Economic Development."J.  Mone- 
tary Econ. 22 (July  1988):  3-42. 
Ramsey, Frank P. "A Mathematical Theory  of Saving." Econ.  J. 38 (December 
1928):  543-59. 
Rebelo,  Sergio.  "Long-Run  Policy  Analysis  and  Long-Run  Growth." J.P.E. 
(1991),  in press. 
Romer,  Paul M. "Increasing  Returns and Long-Run  Growth."J.P.E.  94 (Oc- 
tober  1986):  1002-37. 
"Capital Accumulation  in the Theory  of Long Run Growth." In Mod- 
ern Business Cycle Theory, edited  by  Robert J.  Barro.  Cambridge,  Mass.: 
Harvard  Univ.  Press,  1989. 
. "Endogenous  Technological  Change."J.P.E.,  this issue. 
Samuelson,  Paul A. "The Pure Theory  of Public Expenditure." Rev. Econ. and 
Statis. 36  (November  1954):  387-89. 
Solow,  Robert  M.  "A Contribution  to  the  Theory  of  Economic  Growth." 
Q.J.E. 70  (February  1956):  65-94. 
Summers,  Robert, and Heston,  Alan. "Improved  International  Comparisons 
of  Real Product  and  Its Composition:  1950-1980."  Rev. Income  and Wealth 
30 (June  1984):  207-62. 
. "A New  Set of  International  Comparisons  of Real Product and Price 
Levels: Estimates for  130 Countries,  1950-1985."  Rev. Income  and Wealth  34 
(March  1988):  1-25. 
Thompson,  Earl A. "Taxation and National Defense."J.P.E.  82 (July/August 
1974):  755-82. 